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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this appeal, Mr. Nichols has raised several claims on 
challenges to the sufficiency of the State's evidence to establish 
including 
delicti of the 
charged offense and a claim of fundamental error regarding the trial court's failure to 
instruct the jury regarding corpus delicti. Following the filing of the Respondent's Brief 
in this case, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an Opinion in State v. Suriner', which 
eliminated the corpus delicti requirement in Idaho and left no remaining standard 
requiring corroboration of a confession in its wake. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that retroactive application of the holding 
in Suriner that eliminated the corpus delicti rule to Mr. Nichols' case in this appeal would 
constitute a due process violation, and therefore the merits of Mr. Nichols' claims 
regarding corpus delicti must be adjudicated under the legal standards that existed prior 
to the elimination of this requirement. In addition, this Reply Brief is necessary to clarify 
that, under the pertinent legal standards, the State presented insufficient evidence to 
establish the corpus delicti of the charged offense. 
While Mr. Nichols continues to assert error in the district court's admission of 
hearsay as to the alleged victim's age, the failure of the trial court to properly instruct the 
jury as to the elements of statutory rape and as to corpus delicti, and in the 
prosecutorial misconduct occurring during closing arguments, he will rely on the briefing 
contained within the Appellant's Brief regarding these issues, and will not reiterate his 
arguments herein. 
1 State v. Suriner, 154 Idaho 81 (2013). 
1 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Nichols's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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1. the district Nichols' Rule 29 motion 
judgment of acquittal presented insufficient 
establish the corpus deliciti independent of Mr. Nichols' confession? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nichols' Rule 29 Motion Seeking A 
Judgment Of Acquittal Because The State Presented Insufficient Evidence To Establish 
The Corpus Deliciti Of The Charged Offense independent Of Mr. Nichols' Confession 
A. Introduction 
During the pendency of this appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court in Suriner held that 
it was eliminating the corpus delicti rule in Idaho and establishing no other rule requiring 
corroboration or trustworthiness in its place prior to the admission or use of a confession 
in order to sustain a finding of guilt of a charged offense. However, because this 
holding was both unexpected and indefensible under prior standards of law in Idaho, 
Mr. Nichols asserts that it would violate his constitutional right to due process for the 
elimination of the corpus delicti requirement from the State's burden of proof to be 
applied to his case. 
Under the standards for corpus delicti as it existed in Idaho prior to the issuance 
of the Suriner Opinion, Mr. Nichols further asserts that the State presented insufficient 
evidence of corroboration at trial, and that the State's purported grounds of 
corroboration are likewise insufficient to meet this standard. 
B. It Would Violate Constitutional Principles Of Due Process To Apply The 
Elimination Of The Corpus Delicti Requirement From The Opinion In Suriner To 
Mr. Nichols' Case 
It is well established that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws 
precludes a legislative enactment from being applied retroactively to a criminal 
defendant where that action, among other things, operates so as to alter the legal rules 
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of evidence so as to receive different or less testimony than the law required at the time 
of the commission of the alleged offense. e.g., Carmel! v. 529 U 513, 
1-522 (2000); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1990). Although the 
Post Facto clauses of the State and federal constitutions apply by their terms only to 
legislative enactments provisions, Fifth Amendment of the United 
Constitution provides similar protections with regard to judicial actions that in a 
similar manner. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-192 (1977). This due 
process protection emanates from the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, and "is on the notion that persons have the right to fair warning of 
that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties." /d.; see also v. 
Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 374 n.8 (2010). 
The United States Supreme Court made this clear in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 
378 U.S. 347 (1964). In Bouie, the Court held that, "[t]here can be no doubt that a 
deprivation of the right of fair warning can result not only from vague statutory language 
but also from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise 
statutory language." Bouie, 378 U.S. at 352. The Bouie Court further expanded on the 
nature of such a due process violation when a reviewing court unexpectedly alters the 
common law to a defendant's detriment: 
Indeeed, an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, 
applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law, such as 
Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids. An ex post facto law has been 
defined by this Court as one "that makes an action done before the 
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and 
which punishes such action" or "that aggravates a crime. or makes it 
greater than it was, when committed." If a state legislature is barred by 
the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a 
State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving 
precisely the same result by judicial construction. The fundamental 
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as If a judicial 
construction of a criminal statute is "unexpected and indefensible by 
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in 
issue," it must not be given retroactive effect. 
Id. at 353-354 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Subsequent to Bouie, the United States Supreme Court recognized that this due 
process protection extends not only to judicial interpretations of statutes, but also to 
judicial alterations of protections that existed only at common law. See Rogers v. 
Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001). The Couri in Rogers held that a judicial alteration of 
the prior existing common law cannot be retroactively applied under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment where that alteration is "unexpected and indefensible by 
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct at issue." Id. at 
462. In making this determination, the Rogers Court looked to factors such as whether 
the common law at issue retained current justification for its on-going existence, 
whether it had been given meaningful effect in prior decisions (as opposed to being 
mentioned in passing and as dicta), whether the common law rule involved a 
substantive right, and whether the alteration of the reviewing court was consistent with 
the actions undertaken in other jurisdictions. Id. at 462-467. 
Although the standard articulated in Rogers with regard to when a due process 
violation is established is broad in its sweep, the prior Opinion in Bouie - which formed 
the basis for the Rogers Opinion - provides clearer guidance. In Bouie, the U.S. 
Supreme Court clarified that, "[w]hen a state court overrules a consistent line of 
procedural decisions with the retroactive effect of denying a litigant a hearing in a 
pending case, it thereby deprive him of due process of law 'in its primary sense of an 
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opportunity to be heard and to defend (his) substantive right.'" Bouie, 378 354 
678 (1930)) (quoting Brinkerhoff~Faris Trust and Co. v. Hill, 1 U 
(emphasis added). In other words, where there is an line of case law 
wherein a substantive right has been recognized by the courts, an departure 
consistent of holdings cannot be retroactively applied to criminal 
defendant under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Lancaster v. 
Metrish, 683 F.3d 740,744 (6th Cir. 2012). 
It was this standard that led the Supreme Court of Colorado to conclude that its 
judicial abrogation of the corpus delicti requirement could not be applied retroactively 
under due process principles. In People v. LaRosa, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
had occasion to revisit the on-going viability of the corpus delicti rule in the context of a 
case where the only corroboration of a defendant's confession of sexual assault was the 
opportunity for the defendant to have committed the offense. People v. LaRosa, 293 
P.3d 567, 570-579 (Colo. 2013). After a discussion of the roots of the corpus delicti rule 
under the Colorado common law, the Colorado Supreme Court ultimately abandoned 
this rule in favor of a more general trustworthiness standard. Id. However, this did not 
end the discussion regarding the disposition of the LaRosa case: the Colorado Supreme 
Court still had to resolve whether this alteration could be applied retroactively under the 
Due Process Clause. 
The LaRosa Court determined that it could not. In LaRosa, the Court first 
distinguished the abolition of the corpus delicti rule from the common law rule at issue in 
the Rogers Opinion. LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 578-579. In particular, the LaRosa Court 
noted that the common law rule at issue in Rogers was characterized as a "substantive 
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principle" of law, "'in name only' because it had never been enforced" in any state court 
I and "had never as a ground of decision in any homicide prosecution in 
the and had only been mentioned in three cases, each time in dicta." Id. at 579 
(quoting Rogers, 532 U.S. 464). Although recognizing that the corpus delicti rule 
had subject to some criticism, the Colorado Supreme Court nevertheless 
recognized that the rule had been in actual force in several jurisdictions, including the 
court's own prior decisions. Id. In fact, the LaRosa Court noted the corpus delicti 
rule had been the substantive law in Colorado for over one hundred years. Id. 
Accordingly, because overturning this rule was a clear, and therefore unexpected, break 
from well-established case law, the Court in LaRosa he!d that it would violate due 
process to apply the elimination of this rule to those whose convictions arose prior to its 
decision. As such, the Court in LaRosa reversed the defendant's conviction. Id. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Utah has also held that it would be 
unconstitutional to apply the elimination of its common law corpus delicti rule 
retroactively to those whose offenses arose prior to the court's decision. See State v. 
Mauch/ey, 67 P.3d 477 (Utah 2003). Moreover, the conclusion that the elimination of 
the corpus delicti rule cannot be retroactively applied is consistent with prior decisions 
from the Supreme Court of Idaho in a related context. 
In State v. Byers, the Idaho Supreme Court eliminated the common law 
requirement of corroboration of an alleged victim's allegation of rape in prosecutions for 
this offense. State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 160-165 (1981). However, in doing so the 
Court recognized that it was altering the quantum of proof required in order to establish 
this offense. Id. at 165-167. In light of this, the Byers Court held that the corroboration 
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rule must be followed with regard to the defendant in that along with those who 
were tried prior to the issuance of the Court's opinion. Id. 
The Court in Byers so held because, "[t]o apply today's decision in passing on 
validity of Syers' conviction would be the equivalent of applying an ex post facto law, 
and is within the prohibitions of Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution and Art. 
I, § 16 of our Idaho Constitution." Id. at 166. The Byers Court recognized that the 
elimination of the corroboration requirement, "alters the rules of evidence such that 'less 
or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense 
(is necessary) in order to convict the offender.'" Id. (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354) 
(alterations in the original). In light of this, Byers Court held that the newly 
announced rule eliminating the corroboration requirement, "is to be applied 
prospectively to criminal trials commenced hereafter." Id. at 167. 
As with Byers, Idaho courts prior to Suriner had consistently recognized the 
corpus delicti rule in Idaho - dating back over one hundred years to its adoption in 
State v. Keller in 1902.2 See, e.g., State v. Tiffany, 139 Idaho 909 (2004); State v. Urie, 
92 Idaho 71 (1968); State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699 (1902); State v. Roth, 138 Idaho 820 
(Ct. App. 2003). And, like LaRosa, this rule was not one that had never had substantive 
force in Idaho - the requirements of corpus delicti were unequivocally recognized as 
part of the State's burden of proof of the charged offense at trial. See, e.g., Thomas v. 
State, 145 Idaho 765, 771 (Ct. App. 2008); Roth, 138 Idaho at 822. 
2 By appellate counsel's count, there are approximately 70 cases in Idaho that have 
analyzed and applied the corpus delicti rule in Idaho as part of its substantive law. For 
sake of brevity, only a sampling of cases are cited herein. 
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Moreover, the elimination of the corpus delicti rule in Idaho under Suriner is 
particularly unexpected, given that the Idaho Supreme Court has left no standard of 
corroboration in its wake in order for a conviction to be sustained on the basis of a 
confession alone. In eliminating the corpus delicti rule in Idaho, the Suriner Court held 
Because the harm caused by the rule exceeds whatever benefits there 
may be, we hold that the corpus delicti rule no longer applies in Idaho. 
see no reason 
Instead, the jury can give a defendant's extrajudicial confession or 
statement whatever weight it deems appropriate along with all of the other 
evidence when deciding whether the State has proved guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt 
Suriner, 154 Idaho at 88 (emphasis added). 
This represents a drastic departure, not only from over a hundred years of prior 
established jurisprudence in Idaho, but with the general requirements for admission of 
or use of a confession in order to establish guilt throughout the country. "Courts adhere 
almost universally to the principle that 'an extrajudicial confession, by itself, is not 
sufficient to sustain a conviction for a crime.'" Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477, 481 (quoting 
State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353, 354 (1957)) (emphasis added). This nearly universal 
requirement of additional corroboration was further reflected in LaRosa, wherein the 
Supreme Court of Colorado recognized that, "[a]lmost all courts adhere to a 
corroboration requirement, which requires the prosecution to present corroborating 
evidence of a defendant's confession to either allow for its admission into evidence or 
sustain a conviction." LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567, 571 (emphasis added). 
Although the modern trend has been to adopt a general trustworthiness standard 
with regard to the admission and use of criminal confessions, the fact remains that 
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requirement corroboration remains in nearly all jurisdictions with regard to a 
Accordingly, the Opinion in Suriner also represents a 
departure from the case law in nearly all jurisdictions in that there is now no standard 
that has supplanted corpus delicti in ensuring the reliability and factual corroboration of 
a criminal confession - or its use as the sole proof of guilt in a criminal case. 
Finally, a clear indication that the elimination of corpus delicti in Idaho should not 
be retroactively applied comes from the Suriner Court itself. In the Suriner Opinion, the 
Idaho Supreme Court did not apply its decision to eliminate the corpus delicti rule to the 
defendant's own case rather, the Court first analyzed whether the traditional legal 
standards of corpus delicti had been met in the defendant's case before proceeding to 
eliminate the rule. Suriner, 154 Idaho at 1095-1098. Had the rule eliminating corpus 
delicti been intended to apply retroactively, the Suriner Court would have applied it in 
Mr. Suriner's case, and would not have applied the prior rule in that case. Based upon 
the Suriner Court's implicit decision not to do so, this indicates that the elimination of the 
corpus delicti rule was not intended to operate retroactively. 
C. Under The Standards For Corpus Delicti Under Idaho Law Prior To The 
Elimination Of This Requirement, The State Presented Insufficient Evidence Of 
Corroboration Of Mr. Nichols' Confession 
Mr. Nichols asserts that, under the standards required to establish the corpus 
delicti of the charged offense, the State presented insufficient evidence to apart from 
Mr. Nichol'S own admissions to police to establish corroboration. 
The State has first asserted that the mere opportunity to commit the offense is 
itself corroboration. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) This assertion is in error. In order 
to establish the corpus delicti of the charged offense in Idaho, the State bears the 
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burden to show either the charged injury or the criminal agency and the mere 
opportunity to commit the charged not meet either prong. See Roth, 138 
Idaho at 822-823; LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 571-579; People v. Robson, 80 P.3d 912, 913 
(Colo. App. 2003); State v. Campbell, 178 P.3d 337, 340 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); State v. 
Ray, 926 P.2d 904, 907 (Wash. 1996). The reason behind this was stated succinctly by 
the Oregon Court of Appeals in Campbell - "The evidence showing that defendant had 
an to commit the establishes only that~that he had 
opportunity; it does not tend to establish that the offenses actually occurred." Campbell, 
1 
the argument existed additional "corroboration" due 
uivocal circumstances" under which Mr. Nichols was found in the alleged 
victim's is similarly misplaced. While there was testimony as to the alleged 
victim's and Mr. Nichols' age, the only evidence as to any relationship between 
them in the record or relied upon by the State in this appeal - comes directly from 
Mr. Nichols' own confession to the police. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11 (citing to 
Tr., p.85, L.7 - p.87, L.24; p.95, L.9 - 98, L.1.) The corpus delicti rule requires that the 
corroboration come from a source aside from the confession itself. See Suriner, 154 
Idaho at 83. As was set noted by the Court in Suriner, the corpus delicti rule requires 
that, "'there must be some evidence or corroborating circumstances tending to show 
that a crime has been committed, aside from such confessions or statements," Id. 
While multiple confessions to third parties may suffice for this rule, using the confession 
itself to "corroborate" the confession does not. Id. at 1095-1098. Otherwise, there 
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would no requirement all corpus delicti rule mere internal 
suffice. 
reliance on that the victim unidentified 
entirely unknown cannot stand as 
Brief, p.n.) A review of testimony at trial shows that 
was literally nothing of the nature, subject matter, tenor or timing of these 
statements that was placed into evidence the jury and without any sUbstance of 
remarks at all, there can be no corroboration of either criminal agency or injury as 
is required to sustain proof of corpus delicti. Tr., p.70, Ls.1 p.110,Ls.6-18.) 
The to establish any proof of the corpus delicti of charged offense 
in is burden at trial. Accordingly, Mr. Nichols that this 
Court reverse conviction for with prejud 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Nichols respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction for 
statutory rape with prejudice, as there was insufficient evidence of the charged offense. 
In the alternative, Mr. Nichols respectfully requests that this Court reverse his judgment 
of conviction and sentence and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 14th day of May, 2013. 
'SffRAH E. TOMPKINS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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